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Carbon regulation is intended to reduce global emissions, but there is growing concern that such regulation
may simply shift production to unregulated regions and increase global emissions in the process. Carbon
taris have emerged as a possible mechanism to address these concerns by imposing carbon costs on imports
at the regulated region's border. I show that, when rms choose from discrete production technologies and
oshore producers hold a comparative cost advantage, carbon leakage can result despite the implementation
of a carbon tari. In such a setting, foreign rms adopt clean technology at a lower emissions price than
rms operating in the regulated region, with foreign entry increasing only over emissions price intervals
within which foreign rms hold this technology advantage. Further, domestic rms are shown to conditionally
oshore production despite the implementation of a carbon tari, adopting cleaner technology when they do
so. As a consequence, when carbon leakage does occur under a carbon tari, it conditionally decreases global
emissions. Three sources of potential welfare improvement realized through carbon taris require both foreign
comparative advantage and endogenous technology choice, underscoring the importance of considering both
in value assessments of such a policy.
1. Introduction
With carbon regulation driving projected production cost increases in excess of 40% in some
industries (Drake et al. 2010, Ryan 2012), such policies endow facilities located outside the regulated
region with a windfall cost advantage, altering the competitive landscape. This cost advantage
enables competitors outside the regulated region (i.e., \foreign" rms) to increase their penetration
into the regulated (i.e., \domestic") region. Further, such policies can lead domestic rms to shift
facilities oshore to avoid carbon-related costs. Such foreign entry and oshoring are both sources
of carbon leakage { the displacement of domestic production and its associated carbon emissions to
oshore locations as a result of climate change policy { which has been shown to erode emissions
improvements resulting from such policy.
Carbon leakage could potentially be mitigated by border adjustments { taris on the carbon
content of imported goods that would incur carbon-costs if produced domestically. Proponents of
border adjustments, including the authors of the Waxman-Markey bill that passed through the
U.S. House of Representatives (U.S. Congress, House 2009), argue that such a measure would level
the playing eld by treating domestic and oshore production equivalently. Opponents, including
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President Obama (Broder 2009, June 28), argue that border adjustments can be interpreted as a
trade barrier and therefore risk sparking trade disputes. Such a policy is also debated in Europe
and Australia where unilateral emissions regulation currently in place is perceived to threaten the
regional economy (e.g., HeidelbergCement 2008, Carmody 2011, March 2).
It is well-established within the literature that, without a border adjustment, carbon leakage
increases global emissions, osetting some or all of the regulation's emission improvements (e.g.,
Babiker 2005, Demailly and Quirion 2006, Ponssard and Walker 2008, Di Maria and van der
Werf 2008, Fowlie 2009). It is a widely held belief among policymakers and practitioners that
the implementation of a symmetric border adjustment will eliminate the threat of leakage (e.g.,
Barry 2009, December 21; Barber 2010, April 15). Developing a model of imperfect competition
between domestic and foreign rms that choose from discrete production technologies, I show
that a symmetric border adjustment does not, in general, eliminate carbon leakage from foreign
entry or oshoring. Rather, when foreign rms hold a comparative cost advantage, they adopt
clean technology at a lower emissions price than domestic rms, and entry conditionally increases
in emissions price intervals in which foreign rms hold this advantage. Further, conditions are
established under which domestic rms shift production oshore despite a border adjustment,
adopting cleaner technology when they do so. As a consequence, when carbon leakage does occur
under a border adjustment, it conditionally decreases global emissions, in sharp contrast to the
increased emissions resulting from leakage without a border adjustment.
A border adjustment is shown to increase welfare, providing greater advantage at higher social
costs of carbon. Four conditional sources of welfare advantage are identied: 1) the preservation of
domestic rm prots by reducing or limiting foreign entry; 2) cleaner entry due to the adoption
of lower emissions technology by foreign rms; 3) cleaner domestic production in settings in which
incentivizing the adoption of clean technology through emissions regulation is not possible without
a border adjustment; and 4) cleaner oshoring by domestic rms. The latter two sources of welfare
advantage are mutually exclusive. Only the rst source is accounted for without technology choice,
underscoring the importance of incorporating that choice into border adjustment welfare analysis.
While border adjustment provides clear advantages, it also raises issues. The welfare-maximizing
emissions price in some settings results in the adoption of clean technology by foreign rms, but not
by domestic rms. In other settings, the welfare-maximizing emissions price under border adjust-
ment, in equilibrium, eliminates foreign entry that would exist if emissions were unregulated. Both
of these outcomes lend credence to claims that a border adjustment could prove anticompetitive.
2. Relation to the Literature
Within the Policy literature, leakage is largely taken as a foregone outcome of the current plans for
the EU-ETS post-2012, when the free allocation of emissions allowances expires (e.g., van AsseltDavid Drake: Carbon tari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and Brewer 2010, Kuik and Hofkes 2010, Monjon and Quirion 2010). Therefore, a key issue in this
literature relates to the legality of border adjustments as a leakage-mitigating mechanism under
WTO and the General Agreement on Taris and Trade (GATT) law (e.g., Grubb and Neuho
2006, van Asselt and Biermann 2007, de Cendra 2006). Most conclude that border adjustments
are legal, conditional on the elimination of the free allocation of allowances (Grubb and Neuho
2006, de Cendra 2006). Others conclude that border adjustments may only be legal for inputs
directly incorporated into nished goods, such as clinker into cement (Biermann and Brohm 2005,
van Asselt and Biermann 2007). In terms of border adjustment design, Grubb and Neuho (2006)
propose a symmetric tari so that imports would incur the same carbon cost that they would
have incurred had they been produced domestically. Ismer and Neuho (2007), on the other hand,
propose a at carbon cost based on the emissions intensity of the \best available technology."
Also within the Policy literature, Demailly and Quirion (2006) simulate the impact of cap-and-
trade emissions allowance allocation methods on the EU cement sector to determine leakage eects.
Similarly, Ponssard and Walker (2008) numerically estimate leakage within EU cement under full
cap-and-trade allowance auctioning. While both studies are based on Cournot competition (the
method employed in the present paper), neither addresses the issues of border adjustment, tech-
nology choice or the potential for EU rms to shift production oshore. Lockwood and Whalley
(2010) note that, within the Policy literature, the border adjustment debate has centered primarily
on the legality issues related to WTO and GATT, with little work focusing on the policy's impact.
Technology innovation and adoption in response to environmental regulation has been a focal
interest in Environmental Economics, with Jae et al. (2002) and Popp et al. (2009) providing
thorough reviews. However, the studies reviewed and the majority of the technology innovation
and adoption literature in Environmental Economics do not address carbon leakage or border
adjustment, which are of primary interest here. Requate (2006) reviews the literature pertaining to
environmental policy under imperfect competition, with the vast majority of the studies considering
homogenously regulated rms without technology choice. Of the exceptions, Bayindir-Upmann
(2004) considers imperfect competition under an environmental tax imposed on a xed number of
exogenously dirty rms, but does not consider border adjustment or technology choice.
Within the Economics literature that studies carbon leakage, most focuses on leakage due only to
foreign entry (e.g., Di Maria and van der Werf 2008, Fowlie 2009). Di Maria and van der Werf (2008)
study leakage through an analytical model of imperfect competition between two asymmetrically
regulated regions, showing that a regulated region's ability to change technology attenuates leakage
eects. Fowlie (2009) studies leakage under imperfect competition when rms operate dierent but
exogenous technologies, nding that leakage eliminates two-thirds of the emissions reduction that
could be obtained by a uniform policy. Babiker (2005) considers leakage in terms of both entryDavid Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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and oshoring in a numerical study, nding that asymmetric emissions regulation increases global
emissions by 30% as a result of leakage. Of these studies, none consider border adjustments or
endogenize the number of foreign entrants and only Di Maria and van der Werf (2008) allow for
technology choice. Also in the economics literature, Ryan (2012) studies emissions regulation as it
relates to the U.S. cement industry, estimating a structural model that endogenizes rm entry, exit,
and capacity decisions with a given technology. However, Ryan (2012) does not explore leakage,
border adjustment, or technology choice { all of which are central to the present paper.
Within the Operations Management (OM) literature, Krass et al. (2010) and Drake et al. (2012)
both consider technology choice under emissions regulation in noncompetitive settings. Zhao et al.
(2010) explores the impact of allowance allocation schemes on technology choice in electric power
markets, assuming a xed number of competitors facing a uniform regulatory environment. Islegen
and Reichelstein (2011) estimate break-even points for the adoption of carbon capture and storage
in power generation. However, foreign entry, oshoring and asymmetric emissions regulation, which
are of primary interest in the present paper, are not considered (or pertinent) in their context.
This paper makes signicant contributions to the Sustainable OM and Environmental Economics
literature by including technology choice and endogenous entry to explore the eects of emissions
regulation with and without border adjustment. Incorporating these elements along with compar-
ative advantage provides a number of important insights, including the centrality of technology
choice in determining foreign entry and oshoring under a border adjustment. As a consequence
of rms' technology-choice-driven entry and oshoring decisions, carbon leakage is shown to con-
ditionally decrease global emissions, which contrasts the strict increase reported in the existing
literature. Clean technology adoption is also shown to conditionally drive three sources of border
adjustment welfare advantage, which are not accounted for without endogenous technology choice.
3. Firm Decisions and Performance without Border Adjustment
Under existing emissions regulation, domestic production incurs emissions costs while oshore
production does not, altering the competitive balance between domestic and foreign rms. While
this section is framed for the setting with no border adjustment, the model explored here also
supports a at carbon tari, such as a tari based on the best available technology as proposed by
Ismer and Neuho (2007). A at carbon tari is independent of the technology with which imports
are produced with, and therefore does not incent technology change among foreign rms. Such a
tari could be incorporated into transport costs, with the results of this section holding.
3.1. Model development
A regulator imposes an emissions price " for each unit of emissions generated through domestic
production. A set of domestic rms Nd =f1;:::;ndg engages in Cournot competition with a set ofDavid Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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foreign rms Nf = f0;:::;nfg.1 Each domestic rm i 2 Nd chooses a production location, l 2 L =
fd;og, where d indicates domestic production and o indicates oshore production. The domestic
market is assumed to be mature prior to the implementation of emissions regulation, which is the
case for emissions-regulated sectors (e.g., cement, steel, glass, and pulp and paper), with the nd
rms strategically committed to serving the region. Foreign rm j 2Nf enters the domestic market
only if it can earn at least operating prot F >0, where F represents a xed entry cost. Each unit
imported into the domestic market incurs transport cost  >0.
Both domestic and foreign rms choose a production technology k 2f1;2g, with unit production
and capital recovery cost k > 0 and \Scope 1" emissions intensity k  0.2 Wlog, technology 1 is
assumed to be more emissions-intensive than technology 2, 1 >2. Oshore production generates
an additional  > 0 emissions per unit through transport. A discount factor  is the relative
dierence in production and capital recovery cost between oshore and domestic regions (due to
dierences in labor and other input costs).
Three assumptions are made with respect to technology costs:
Assumption 1. The production and capital recovery cost for a given technology is less in export-
ing regions than in the domestic region;  2(0;1) so that i <i;8i2f1;2g.
This assumption follows from the signicant labor cost advantage of exporting regions relative to
importing regions of interest in emissions regulation contexts { e.g., the average hourly manufac-
turing labor cost in China is roughly 3-4% of U.S. and European levels (Banister and Cook 2011),
and the equivalent cost in Mexico is less than 18% of U.S. and European levels (U.S. Bureau of
Labor Statistics 2010).
Assumption 2. The production and capital recovery cost of the dirty technology is less than the
production and capital recovery cost of the clean technology; 1 <2.
If either type were dominated in both production and capital recovery cost as well as emissions
intensity, rms' would not consider it. The focus here is on settings where rms have a technology
choice. Therefore, given 1 >2, Assumption 2 ensures that technology 1 is not trivially discarded.
Assumption 3. The domestic production cost of the dirty technology is less than the transport
plus oshore production cost of the dirty technology; 1 <1 +.
1 As Fowlie (2009) points out, empirical work suggests that rm behavior in emissions-intensive industries comports
with static, oligopolistic competition in quantities.
2 The Greenhouse Gas Protocol denes Scope 1 emissions as resulting from a rm's direct activities. These exclude
emissions from purchased electricity (Scope 2) and supplier activities (Scope 3). The emissions regulated under existing
policy are Scope 1. Since power generation is a regulated sector under existing policy (e.g., European Parliament and
Council 2003, Australian Government 2011), including purchased electricity would double-count those emissions.David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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Under this assumption, domestic rms produce locally when emissions are unregulated. While this
assumption will not hold for all sectors in the general economy, it is reasonable for carbon-regulated
sectors. Without such an assumption, there would be no domestic production to regulate.
Each rm selects the lowest-cost technology available, with ci(") representing the total unit cost
of domestic rms' preferred technology, and cj representing the total unit cost of foreign rms'
preferred technology, such that
ci(")= min
k2f1;2g
fk +k"; k +g; 8i2Nd and cj = min
k2f1;2g
k +; 8j 2Nf:
For ease of exposition, the unit production cost and the emissions intensity of domestic rms'
preferred technology will be referred to as i and i, respectively. Similarly, j and j will refer to
the unit production cost and emissions intensity, respectively, of foreign rms' preferred technology.
Table 1 summarizes cost and emissions parameters.
Parameter Description
" Price per unit of CO2 emissions
 Transport cost per nished good unit
F Fixed entry cost (e.g, domestic headquarters, customer acquisition)
i, j Domestic and foreign rms' production and capital recovery cost
i, j Emissions intensity of domestic and foreign rms' preferred technology
 Emissions intensity of transport
 Discount factor for oshore production
ci(") Total unit cost of domestic rms' preferred technology
cj Total unit cost of foreign rms' preferred technology
Table 1 Cost and emissions parameters in setting without border adjustment
Domestic rm i produces xi;l units with its preferred technology/location option, with total
domestic production Xd =
Pnd
i=1xi;d and total production oshored by domestic producers Xo =
Pnd
i=1xi;o. Foreign rm j produces yj units with its preferred technology, with total production
by foreign entrants Y =
Pnf
j=1yj. The market is assumed to clear at price P (Xd;Xo;Y ) = A  
b(Xd +Xo +Y ), with A>ndci(") to avoid the trivial case where no competitor produces, and with
b>0.3 Therefore, domestic rm i solves
max
xi;l
i(Xd;Xo;Y )= max
xi;l;8l
X
l2L
h
P (Xd;Xo;Y )xi;l  ci(")xi;l
i
; 8i2Nd (1)
s:t: xi;l 0; 8i2Nd; l 2L;
while foreign competitor j solves
max
yj
j (Xd;Xo;Y )=max
yj
h
P (Xd;Xo;Y )yj  cjyj
i
;8j 2Nf (2)
s:t: yj 0; 8j 2Nf:
All proofs, including the joint concavity of (1) and (2), are provided in Technical Appendix T.1.
3 Given the highly-commoditized nature of emissions-regulated sectors (e.g., power generation, cement, steel, lime,
and pulp and paper), I assume that demand is homogenous with respect to production technology and location.David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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Sunk capacity, demand uncertainty and capacity constraints. I study the long-term equilibrium,
focusing on eects of emissions regulation and border adjustment at steady state. This abstracts
from the issue of sunk capacity, which could eect emissions and potentially total output in the
short-run. Emissions would be greater in the short-run (vis-a-vis the long-run equilibrium) if rms'
adopt clean technology in the long-run, unless emissions price were suciently great to cause rms
to forego the remaining useful life of legacy capacity. On the other hand, if oshoring occurs in
the long-run equilibrium, sunk capacity would delay this shift and emissions would be less in the
short-run without border adjustment, but greater with it (vis-a-vis the long-run equilibrium). Since
short-run marginal costs are less than the production and capital recovery costs pertinent in the
long-run, emissions and total output would be greater in the short-run if rms had over-invested
in capacity relative to the long-run equilibrium, which is less likely in sectors with positive growth.
I also abstract from demand uncertainty, and with it, capacity constraints. If these elements were
incorporated, capacity that could serve both the oshore market (which is not pertinent in the
deterministic setting) and the domestic market would prot from demand pooling { a reduction in
overage and underage costs { with this eect decreasing in the correlation of domestic and oshore
demand. To the extent that the deterministic setting reects expected demand under uncertainty,
total output and global emissions would be over-stated in the deterministic setting relative to
expectations under uncertainty due to the right-censoring eect of capacity constraints. Further,
if foreign rms adopt clean technology to serve the domestic market in equilibrium, overage could
be used to serve the oshore market; a clean spill-over eect that would diminish with positive
correlation between domestic and oshore demand.
3.2. Equilibrium technology choice and foreign entry
Corollary 1. Clean technology will not be adopted at any " if  <2  1 +2

2 1
1 2

.
It follows from Assumption 2 that, without a border adjustment, foreign rms will not adopt
clean technology in equilibrium. In terms of domestic rms, if the condition in Corollary 1 does
not hold, then they would produce in the regulated region and adopt clean technology at the
emissions price threshold "d
2 =
2 1
1 2, which is derived by a cost comparison of type 1 and type
2. However, if the condition does hold, then the emissions price at which domestic rms would
shift production oshore "o =
1+ i
i is less than "d
2. In such a case, domestic rms would not
adopt clean technology at any emissions price; it would be more protable for them to operate
dirty technology oshore than produce domestically. Under these conditions, a regulator could not
incentivize clean technology adoption through emissions regulation without border adjustment.
The number of foreign rms entering the domestic market will depend on the number of domestic
competitors already established in the market, their cost structure and market parameters. FirmsDavid Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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are assumed to compete operating prots down to the minimum level that motivates entry; that
is, maxf0;nfj
j(Xd;Xo;Y )=Fg: The following proposition characterizes equilibrium entry:
Proposition 1. Without border adjustment, the number of foreign rms entering the market is
n

f =max

0;
A 1    nd(1 +  ci("))
p
Fb
 nd  1

:
Under conditions such that domestic rms shift production oshore (i.e., ci(") = cj), the number
of foreign entrants is independent of emissions price. On the other hand, if oshoring does not
occur in equilibrium, the number of foreign rms competing in the domestic market increases in
emissions price at a rate of
ndi p
Fb. The latter is the scenario currently playing out within the European
cement industry. Historically, signicant transport costs led to large total landed costs for foreign
competitors relative to domestic rms, cj >ci(0). This limited entry by foreign competitors, with
one study of the U.S. cement market reporting that 99.8% of cement was transported less than 500
miles (Jans and Rosenbaum 1997). However, with emissions costs under the EU-ETS threatening
to dominate transport costs, European cement rms now see foreign producers as an existential
threat to the continued production of cement within the EU (HeidelbergCement 2008).
3.3. Equilibrium quantities and emissions
As the purported driver of anthropogenic climate change, global emissions are relevant to the
domestic regulator. Domestic emissions are also relevant if the regulator itself is exposed to emis-
sions costs through Kyoto Protocol (or similar) commitments. Global emissions, eg, and domestic
emissions, ed, are respectively dened as
e
g(Xd;Xo;Y )=Xdi +Xo(i +)+Y (j +) and e
d(Xd)=Xdi: (3)
Analysis is organized here and in Section 4.3 based on the market structure that results under
emissions regulation: a domestic oligopoly; foreign entry with domestic rms producing in the
regulated region; and the oshoring of domestic production (with or without foreign entry).
3.3.1. Domestic oligopoly
Proposition 2. Assume n
f = 0 and " <
1+ i
i . In equilibrium, a domestic oligopoly results
with quantities of x
i;d =
A i+i"
b(nd+1) and y
j =0.
From Proposition 1, it follows that foreign rms will not enter; that is n
f =0 if emissions price is
less than the threshold "enter =
(nd+1)(1++
p
Fb) ndi A
ndi . Domestic rms produce in the regulated
region if emissions price is less than the oshoring threshold "o =
1+ i
i . Under these conditions,
a domestic oligopoly results, with domestic rms producing at quantities resembling well-known
Cournot oligopoly quantities. In this setting, domestic quantities and total output, as well as
domestic and global emissions, all trivially decrease in emissions price and decrease discontinuously
at the threshold of clean technology adoption "d
2 =
2 1
1 2, if "d
2 2[0;"enter].David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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3.3.2. Foreign entry without oshoring
Proposition 3. Assume n
f >0 and "<
1+ i
i . In equilibrium,
a) Foreign entry results with quantities x
i;d =
p
Fb
b +
1+ i i"
b and y
j =
p
Fb
b .
b) Foreign entry strictly increases in ", while domestic quantities strictly decrease in ".
c) Total output is xed in ".
d) Domestic emissions strictly decrease in ", while global emissions strictly increase in ".
With domestic rms producing in the regulated region, foreign entry occurs when "2["enter;"o). If
this interval is null, "enter >"o, then entry will not arise in equilibrium at any emissions price. Given
that " 2 ["enter;"o), domestic rm i's production exceeds foreign rm j's since i + i" < 1 + 
when there is not oshoring. Total domestic production decreases with respect to emissions price
at rate  
ndi
b . As noted in the discussion of Proposition 1, the number of foreign entrants increases
in emissions price at a rate of
ndi p
Fb. Given each foreign rm's equilibrium production, y
j =
p
Fb
b ,
total foreign production increases at a rate of
ndi
b in emissions price. Therefore, total output in the
sector is independent of emissions price in this setting, with decreases in domestic output balanced
by equal increases in foreign entry. Propositions 3a-c are robust to shifts in domestic technology.
If domestic rms adopt cleaner technology in equilibrium, the shift in market share toward foreign
rms in " is attenuated (since 2 <1), but holds directionally. Given that total production remains
unchanged when there is leakage due to entry, the shift from domestic to foreign production results
in a strict increase in global emissions since i j =1 (per Proposition 1) and  >0.
3.3.3. Oshoring with and without foreign entry
Proposition 4. Assume "
1+ i
i . In equilibrium,
a) Domestic rms shift production oshore with domestic and foreign rm quantities of
x

i;o =
(
A 1 
b(nd+1) if "enter "o
p
Fb
b otherwise
and y

j =
(
0 if "enter "o p
Fb
b otherwise.
b) Foreign entry and domestic quantities are xed in ".
c) Global emissions strictly increase as a consequence of oshoring.
When " 
1+ i
i , it is more protable for domestic rms to operate oshore with technology 1
than to produce with the lowest-cost technology in the regulated region. If domestic rms produce
oshore, emissions regulation no longer aects their costs. Therefore, if "enter  "o, foreign entry
will not result as a consequence of carbon regulation at any emissions price. Under such an oshore
oligopoly, domestic rm quantities resemble well-known Cournot oligopoly quantities. However, if
"enter <"o, domestic and foreign rms each produce quantities of
p
Fb
b .David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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Without a border adjustment, domestic and foreign quantities are independent of " at any ""o.
The regulator therefore has limited ability to impact global emissions. Increasing emissions price
beyond "o yields no incremental emissions reduction. Further, the domestic oshoring that results
if " > "o increases emissions intensity; domestic rms use the dirtiest technology when producing
oshore and generate  in transport emissions by importing into the domestic region.
3.4. Discussion of results
Figures 1a and 1b illustrate quantity and entry results from Propositions 2-4. Parameters for all
numerical illustrations are provided in Appendix A.
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Figure 1 Illustrative examples of equilibrium quantities sensitivity to emissions price without border adjustment
In Figure 1a, there is a domestic oligopoly over the interval  1, with production decreasing in ".
At point "enter =
(nd+1)(1++
p
Fb) ndi A
ndi , entry conditions are satised. Therefore, foreign entry
increases in " over  2 per Proposition 3b, while domestic quantities decrease, with total output
constant in " over the interval. Point "o =
1+ i
i indicates the oshoring threshold, beyond which
both domestic- and foreign-owned capacity operate outside the regulated region and are xed in
" per Proposition 4b. Figure 1b is similar except "d
2 < "o, where "d
2 =
2 1
1 2. The lower emissions
intensity of technology 2 decreases exposure to emissions price, which reduces the rate at which
domestic production decreases in intervals 
2 and 
3, and decreases the rate at which foreign rms
enter in 
3. Per Proposition 3c, total output is constant in " over 
3. These results imply that
domestic rms' production decreases monotonically in emissions price without a border adjustment,
while foreign entry monotonically increases.
Emissions regulation without border adjustment limits the policy's ability to impact global
emissions. Increases in emissions price beyond "o incentivize no response from competitors in terms
of output or technology choice since all production takes place oshore. The issue of an industry
oshoring en masse as a consequence of carbon costs is not purely of academic interest. StudiesDavid Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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of the European cement industry suggest that all production in Italy, Greece, Poland, and the
United Kingdom would shift oshore at an emissions price of 25 Euro per ton of CO2 { less than
the projected emissions costs under EU-ETS Phase III { with this oshoring increasing global
emissions by an estimated minimum of 7 million tons of CO2 (Boston Consulting Group 2008).
Emissions eects are illustrated in Figures 2a and 2b, but are more pronounced in Figure 2b,
where leakage implies a shift from technology 2 production to technology 1 production.
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Figure 2 Illustrative examples of global emissions sensitivity to emissions price without border adjustment.
In settings within which domestic rms produce locally, " < "o, increases in emissions price
beyond "enter lead to the counterintuitive eect of increasing global emissions despite reductions
in domestic emissions. Under such circumstances, a portion of domestic production is displaced
by oshore production that is more emissions-intensive (when transport is taken into account).
As a consequence, the only interval over emissions prices in which the regulator can reduce global
emissions without a border adjustment is in the case of a domestic oligopoly.
4. Firm Decisions and Performance with Border Adjustment
Much debate related to emissions regulation has centered on border adjustments as a possible
means to prevent the adverse environmental eects of carbon leakage. It is therefore important to
understand how border adjustments impact technology choices, production decisions, and regional
competitiveness. Border adjustments are explored here through symmetric carbon costs for domes-
tic and oshore goods production.4
4 Grubb and Neuho (2006) argue that a \symmetric" border adjustment is nondiscriminatory and therefore the
most likely to be feasible under WTO and GATT law (given the elimination of freely-allocated emissions allowances).David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
12
4.1. Model development
The model here resembles that in Section 3 except that each imported unit now incurs a bor-
der adjustment k = k" 8k 2 f1;2g. Hat notation distinguishes parameters of rms' preferred
technology when a border adjustment is in place from those when it is not, with ^ ci(") and ^ cj(")
representing the total cost of domestic and foreign rms' preferred technology, respectively:
^ ci(")= min
k2f1;2g
fk+k"; k+k(")+g; 8i2Nd and ^ cj(")= min
k2f1;2g
k+k(")+; 8j 2Nf:
Similarly, ^ i, ^ i, ^ j, and ^ j denote the production cost and emissions eciency of domestic and
foreign rms' preferred technology. In a border adjustment setting, domestic and foreign rms solve
objectives (1) and (2), respectively, after substituting ^ ci(") for ci(") and ^ cj (") for cj.
4.2. Equilibrium technology choice and foreign entry
A border adjustment signicantly aects technology adoption for both domestic and foreign rms,
which the following proposition makes evident.
Proposition 5. In equilibrium, a) There is an " at which domestic rms adopt clean technology;
b) conditional on entry, foreign rms adopt clean technology at a lower emissions price than rms
producing domestically do; and c) if domestic rms shift production oshore, they do so at emissions
price ^ "o =
2+ 1
1 2 and adopt cleaner technology than they had operated domestically.
With a border adjustment, there is an emissions price at which domestic rms adopt clean
technology. Since oshore facilities' are exposed to emissions costs, domestic rms still have an
incentive to reduce emissions if they produce oshore simply by serving the region. Further, given
that oshore production and capital recovery costs are less than domestic production and capital
recovery costs ( <1 by Assumption 1), foreign rms adopt clean technology to serve the domestic
market at a lower emissions price than domestic rms do. The threshold emissions price at which
foreign rms adopt clean technology is ^ "
f
2 =

2 1
1 2

. Clean technology is adopted in the domestic
region at "d
2 =
2 1
1 2, identical to the adoption threshold without border adjustment.5 While ^ "
f
2 <"d
2
follows clearly from their characterizations, it runs counter to intuition. Under a border adjustment,
foreign rms importing into the domestic market are more sensitive to the region's regulation than
domestic producers. Conditional upon entry, foreign rms operate cleaner technology than locally
producing domestic rms when "2

^ "
f
2;"d
2

, and operate identical technology when " = 2

^ "
f
2;"d
2

.
Under a border adjustment, oshoring always results in the adoption of cleaner technology.
Consider the cost frontiers of domestic- and oshore-operated technologies depicted in Figures 3a
5 Hat notation is dropped for "
d
2 to indicate the equivalency of the clean technology domestic adoption threshold with
and without border adjustment.David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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and 3b. Given a symmetric border adjustment, the oshore cost frontier parallels the domestic cost
frontier when the preferred technology in each region is the same; that is, " = 2

^ "
f
2;"d
2

. However, over
emissions price intervals in which oshore production uses cleaner technology { when "2

^ "
f
2;"d
2

{
the oshore cost frontier is less steep than the domestic cost frontier. It is only possible for these
cost frontiers to intersect over emissions price intervals in which the preferred oshore technology
is cleaner than the preferred domestic technology. As a consequence, a border adjustment implies
that domestic rms adopt cleaner technology than they had used domestically when they shift
oshore. These frontiers further imply that, if  +

2 > 1 (which is equivalent to "d
2 < ^ "o, where
^ "o =
2+ 1
1 2 ), domestic adoption of clean technology would preempt oshoring and domestic rms
would operate within the regulated region at any emissions price. Without technology choice, it
is clear from the gures that oshore and domestic production costs under a border adjustment
would be parallel, and there would be no oshoring at any emissions price.
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Figure 3 Total cost frontiers when technologies are operated domestically (black) and oshore (gray). When "
is suciently great, domestic rms adopt clean technology in the regulated region (Figure 3a) or when
they shift oshore (Figure 3b). The domestic adoption of clean technology preempts oshoring in 3a
and oshoring preempts the domestic adoption of clean technology in 3b.
Technology adoption under a border adjustment diers markedly from adoption without such a
policy, but a border adjustment's impact on foreign entry is less pronounced.
Corollary 2. With a border adjustment, the number of foreign rms entering the market is
n

f =max

0;
A ^ j   ^ j"   nd(^ j + ^ j"+  ^ ci("))
p
Fb
 nd  1

:
The number of foreign entrants under a border adjustment structurally resembles the number
without such a mechanism (given in Proposition 1). While it appears that the right-hand argument
of Corollary 2 is at least
(nd+1)2" p
Fb less than the right-hand argument in Proposition 1, such level
comparisons between settings make the assumption that " is the same with and without border
adjustment. As shown in Section 5, this is not, in general, the case if the regulator can control ".David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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4.3. Equilibrium quantities and emissions
As in Section 3, results are organized here by the market structure that emerges in equilibrium:
domestic oligopoly, entry without oshoring, and oshoring with or without entry.
4.3.1. Domestic oligopoly
Corollary 3. Assume n
f = 0, and " <
2+ 1
1 2 or  +

2 > 1. In equilibrium, a domestic
oligopoly results with quantities of x
i;d =
A ^ i ^ i"
b(nd+1) and y
j =0.
If domestic rms produce oshore in equilibrium, they do so at " ^ "o. However, when  +

2 >1,
the domestic technology threshold "d
2 =
2 1
1 2 is less than the oshoring threshold "o =
1+ i
i .
Therefore, if " <
2+ 1
1 2 or  +

2 > 1, domestic rms produce within the regulated region by
Corollary 5c. The conditions in Corollary 3 therefore result in a domestic oligopoly in equilibrium,
in which case quantities are identical with and without a border adjustment.
4.3.2. Foreign entry without oshoring
Proposition 6. Assume n
f >0, and "<
2+ 1
1 2 or  +

2 >1. In equilibrium,
a) Foreign entry results with quantities x
i;d =
p
Fb
b +
^ j+^ j"+ ^ i ^ i"
b and y
j =
p
Fb
b .
b) Foreign entry increases in " if foreign rms operate cleaner technology and
1
2 > 1+
1
nd, but
otherwise decreases in ".
c) Domestic production decreases in " if foreign rms operate cleaner technology, but otherwise
is xed in ".
d) Total output strictly decreases in ".
e) Global emissions decrease in foreign entry i  <(1  2)+
2(2+)
nd(1 2).
Foreign entry is nonmonotonic or strictly decreases under a border adjustment. This diers from
the setting without border adjustment, in which entry monotonically increases in ". Entry decreases
in " when foreign rms operate the same technology that domestic rms do; " = 2

^ "
f
2;"d
2

, recalling
that ^ "
f
2 =

2 1
1 2

and "d
2 =
2 1
1 2. But entry can increase in " when foreign rms operate cleaner
technology than domestic rms; "2

^ "
f
2;"d
2

. As a consequence foreign rms exit the market at the
threshold ^ "1
exit =f"2[0; ^ "
f
2)jnf =0g when both domestic and foreign rms prefer technology 1, and
at ^ "2
exit =f""d
2jnf =0g when both sets of rms operate technology 2, where nf is the right-hand
argument in Corollary 2. Foreign rms enter the market under border adjustment at the threshold
^ "enter =f"2[^ "
f
2;"d
2)jnf =0g when foreign rms operate cleaner technology than domestic rms.
Following from Corollary 2, the number of entrants increases in " within this interval at a rate
of
 2+nd(1 2) p
Fb , which is nonnegative when
1
2  1 +
1
nd. The LHS of this condition is greater
than 1 and the RHS decreases in the number of domestic competitors; conditional on foreign entry,
more competitive domestic markets decrease the hurdle beyond which entry will increase in ". TheDavid Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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environmental benet derived from cleaner foreign production dominates the negative impact of
additional transport emissions when the conditions of Proposition 6e hold, resulting in a decrease
in global emissions as a consequence of increased foreign entry. This diers notably from the case
with no border adjustment, in which global emissions strictly increase within incremental entry.
Over intervals in which foreign rms operate cleaner technology than domestic rms, x
i;d
decreases in " at a rate of  
1 2
b . Over intervals in which foreign and domestic rms operate
identical technologies, x
i;d is independent of ". This inelasticity of domestic rm quantities in "
over intervals in which rms operate the same technology limits the regulator's ability to impact
domestic emissions to intervals over " in which foreign rms operate cleaner technology. This diers
from the setting without border adjustment in which x
i;d strictly decreases in ".
Total output decreases in " under a border adjustment. When domestic and foreign rms oper-
ate identical technologies, total foreign quantities decrease in " per Proposition 6a and domestic
quantities remain xed per Proposition 6b. When foreign rms operate cleaner technology than
domestic rms, per Proposition 6a, the rate of total production increase among foreign rms in
" is
nd(1 2) 2
b , while the rate of total domestic decrease in production is  
nd(1 2)
b , resulting
in total output decreasing in " at a rate of  
2
b . This diers from the setting with no border
adjustment, in which total output is xed with respect to emissions price under entry conditions.
4.3.3. Oshoring with and without foreign entry
Proposition 7. Assume "
2+ 1
1 2 and 1 +

2. In equilibrium,
a) Domestic rms produce oshore, with domestic and foreign rm quantities of
x

i;o =
(
A 2 2" 
b(nd+1) if "
A 2  (nd+1)
p
Fb
2 p
Fb
b otherwise
and y

j =
(
0 if "
A 2  (nd+1)
p
Fb
2 p
Fb
b otherwise
b) Total foreign and domestic production strictly decreases in ".
c) Global emissions decrease as a consequence of oshoring at "= ^ "o if 1  2 >.
d) Global emissions strictly decrease in ".
Domestic rms produce oshore in equilibrium under a border adjustment when "  ^ "o, recalling
that ^ "o =
2+ 1
1 2 , if (and only if) ^ "o  "d
2, which is equivalent to 1   +

2. It is counterintuitive
that domestic rms may produce oshore when import carbon costs are symmetric to domestic
carbon costs. However, it is optimal to do so over emissions price intervals in which foreign rms
operate cleaner technology in equilibrium, as discussed following Proposition 5c. Quantities under
oshoring depend on whether or not entry conditions are met. When "
A 2  (nd+1)
p
Fb
2 , foreign
rms do not enter under oshoring conditions. This results in an oshore oligopoly, with domestic
rm (and total) quantities decreasing in " at a rate of  
2
b(nd+1). When " >
A 2  (nd+1)
p
Fb
2 ,David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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foreign rms enter, with the number of entrants decreasing in " at a rate of  
2 p
Fb and domestic
quantities xed in ", for a total output decrease in " of  
2
b .
Global emissions decrease as a consequence of oshoring if 1 2 >; that is, if the dierence
emissions intensity between clean and dirty technologies is great than the emissions intensity of
transport. In addition to potentially decreasing at the point of oshoring, global emissions decrease
in " in an oshoring equilibrium. In this setting, unlike the setting without border adjustment,
leakage resulting from both foreign entry and oshoring can lead to global emissions improvement
when a border adjustment is implemented.
4.4. Discussion of results
Figures 4a and 4b illustrate selected rm decisions and performance results from above.
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Figure 4 Examples of equilibrium quantities and emissions sensitivity to emissions price with border adjustment.
In Figure 4a, domestic and foreign rms operate dirty technology over  1, with foreign entry
decreasing over that range and domestic production constant, per Proposition 6b and 6c. At point
^ "
f
2 = 

2 1
1 2

, foreign rms adopt technology 2 (at a lower " than domestic rms, per Proposi-
tion 5b). Therefore, foreign rms use cleaner technology than domestic rms and, as a consequence
(given that
1
2  1+
1
nd in this example), entry increases and domestic production decreases in "
over  2 per Propositions 6b and 6c. In  2, if
1
2 <1+
1
nd, then both domestic and foreign production
would decrease, but foreign production would do so at a lesser rate. At point "d
2 =
2 1
1 2, domestic
rms also adopt cleaner technology and, again, domestic production is xed while foreign produc-
tion decreases in ". Finally, per Proposition 6d, total production decreases in " over all intervals. In
this setting, 1 <+

2, so domestic rms do not produce oshore at any emissions price; oshoring
is preempted by domestic clean technology adoption. If 1   +

2, domestic rms would produce
oshore at ^ "o =
2+ 1
1 2 , adopting clean technology when they did so.
As seen in Figures 4a and 4b, with a border adjustment, increases in " not only lead to the
adoption of cleaner technology among domestic rms (an eect noted above to be limited withoutDavid Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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a border adjustment), but can also result in foreign rms adopting cleaner technology to serve
the domestic market. This obviously has implications for global emissions. While carbon leakage
with no border adjustment always increases global emissions, leakage can result in global emissions
improvement under a symmetric border adjustment, as seen in Figure 4b over  2.
In addition to these border adjustment advantages, there are also drawbacks. While the goal
of emissions regulation is to reduce global emissions, there can be costs associated with failing
to achieve domestic emissions targets. Under a border adjustment, a regulator may not be able
to achieve these targets directly, as domestic emissions are unresponsive to changes in " when
domestic and foreign production use the same technology, as in regions  1 and  3. The regulator
may therefore become more reliant on Joint Implementation or Clean Development Mechanism
allowances, which can be costly and subject to an uncertain review process. Further, foreign entry
conditionally decreases in " when foreign rms operate cleaner technology than domestic rms as in
region  2, and strictly decreases in " when domestic and foreign rms operate similar technology. In
settings where foreign rms compete in the domestic market when "=0, this implies that a border
adjustment can increase domestic market share relative to the unregulated baseline, arguably giving
credence to concerns about the potential anti-competitiveness of border adjustments.
Challenges in implementing a border adjustment. If a regulator chose to adopt a border adjust-
ment, it would face challenges in implementing the policy. First, there are legality concerns. Policy
scholars have argued that a symmetric border adjustment is legal under WTO and GATT law so
long as regulated domestic sectors are not awarded free emissions allowances (Grubb and Neuho
2006). Even so, due to the diculty in measuring emissions, many legal battles would likely ensue,
delaying the policy's implementation (Kanter 2009, December 17). This relates to another set of
challenges: reporting and monitoring. Emissions are not contained in an imported good, they are
emitted into the atmosphere. Therefore, they must be measured at the point of production rather
than through inspection at the border. Given the potential for noncompliance and misreporting in
such a setting, auditing processes and policies for dealing with fraudulent claims would have to be
established. Working in a border adjustment favor, emissions regulation eects a limited number
of sectors, and the sectors targeted for border adjustment could be prioritized and limited further
(e.g., the European Commission has explored such a policy for the cement and steel sectors only).
5. Domestic Regulator's Decision and Welfare Performance
Sections 3 and 4 focused on the operational drivers underpinning the welfare eects of emissions
regulation: technology choice, facility location, production quantities, and the emissions that result.
In this section, welfare itself is the focus.
In setting an emissions price, the welfare-maximizing domestic regulator must consider emissions
revenues, its own costs due to domestic emissions, and emissions-driven social costs in additionDavid Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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to the traditional welfare drivers of rm prots and consumer surplus. The latter elements are
straightforward. Total domestic rm prots are ndi(), with i() dened by (1). Given the demand
curve in Sections 3 and 4, consumer surplus is  (") =
1
2[A P()](X +Y ), which is equivalent to
  =
1
2b
 
ndx
i(")+n
f(")y
j(")
2
.
Unit border adjustment costs are j, with j = 0 without border adjustment and j = j with
border adjustment. Since domestic and foreign rms use identical technology when producing o-
shore, imports to the region incur border adjustment j when produced by either type of rm. The
domestic regulator therefore garners emissions revenues, (") = (Xdi +(Xo +Y )j)". Domestic
rms' emissions costs are a transfer payment to the regulator. Therefore, if there is no border
adjustment, or if there is no foreign entry under a border adjustment, emissions revenues and
domestic rm emissions costs negate one another with respect to welfare eects.
The regulator itself may incur per ton carbon cost "r 0. In some cases, such as California under
Assembly Bill 32, the regulator does not incur this cost (i.e., "r = 0). In other cases it does, such
as the European Union under its Kyoto Protocol commitments. In either case, the nancial cost
of emissions incurred by the regulator is (";"r)=ed(")"r.
The per-ton social cost of emissions, "s 0, is the monetized climate change damage associated
with a one-ton increase in carbon dioxide equivalent emissions. These costs have been estimated
by the U.S. Government as beginning at $21.40 in 2010 and steadily increasing to $44.90 by 2050
(Greenstone et al. 2011).6 Such social costs provide the impetus for emissions regulation and are
included in the regulator's welfare problem as (";"s)=(ed(")+(eg(") ed(")))"s, where domestic
and global emissions, ed and eg, are dened in (3).
In light of the above, the regulator maximizes welfare, W, through the following objective:
max
" W =max
" (")+ (")+(";j) (";"r) (";"s): (4)
s:t: "0:
The regulator's problem without border adjustment is explored in Section 5.1, and its problem
with a border adjustment is explored in Section 5.2.
5.1. Welfare-maximizing emissions price without border adjustment
As shown in Sections 3 and 4, emissions price impacts rms' location, technology, and entry deci-
sions at specic thresholds. Therefore, when the welfare-maximizing regulator sets emissions price,
it must account for these thresholds and the related changes in rm decisions. Given the dis-
continuous nature of rms' decisions, seven possible scenarios arise in the setting without border
adjustment. Each scenario is enumerated in Figure B.1 of Appendix B, but two representative
settings form the basis for the analysis that follows.
6 Both the 2010 and the 2050 estimates are based on 2007 dollars and a 3% discount rate.David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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Figure 5 Domestic (d) and foreign (f) technology type and domestic rm location in focal settings without
border adjustment. Black indicates foreign entry intervals and gray indicates intervals without entry.
In setting 1 of Figure 5, foreign rms compete in the domestic market at " = 0. Since foreign
entry does not decrease in " when there is no border adjustment, entry persists over all possible
". In this setting, the technology adoption threshold is less than the oshoring threshold, "d
2 < "o,
so there is an interval of emissions prices in which domestic rms would adopt clean technology,
" 2 ["d
2;"o). In setting 2, foreign rms do not compete when emissions are unregulated. Domestic
rms compete solely against each other in a domestic oligopoly over the interval " 2 [0;"enter).
At " > "enter, domestic rms also compete in the market. Domestic rms produce oshore in this
setting at "o <"d
2, so clean technology is not adopted at any emissions price.
As shown in Appendix T.1, without a border adjustment, social welfare is concave in " under a
domestic oligopoly, linear under foreign entry when domestic rms operate in the regulated region,
and independent of " when domestic rms operate oshore.
Setting 1. Social welfare increases in " when domestic rms produce in the regulated region with
technology k and compete against foreign entrants, i "s <"s;k, where
"s;1 = 
p
Fb+1  1"r +  1

and "s;2 = 
p
Fb+1  2"r +  2
1 +  2
;
which are obtained by solving for the "s such that
@W
@" = 0. In settings in which domestic rms
produce in the regulated region and foreign rms compete, entry increases in " per Proposition 3b,
which, in turn, increases global emissions per Proposition 3d. Such an increase in global emissions
becomes more costly from a welfare perspective as "s increases. Therefore, under foreign entry,
welfare decreases in " over "2[0;"d
2) and "2["d
2;"o) if "s is greater than "s;1 and "s;2, respectively.
There is a disjoint change in social welfare at "d
2 and "o, the points at which domestic rms adopt
clean technology and move oshore, respectively. Dene the former as 2 and the latter as o,
where
2 =nd
 p
Fb
b
+
1 +  1  1"d
2
b
!
 
("s +"r)(1  2) 2 +1

; and (5)David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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o = nd
 p
Fb
b
!
 
(1 +  i)"s  i  i"r +1 +

:
Welfare at emissions price "d
2 with technology 2 is compared to welfare at emissions price "d
2 with
technology 1 to obtain 2, and o obtained similarly. The left term of 2 is total domestic produc-
tion at the point of clean technology adoption. The right term is the per-unit welfare benet/cost
of switching to clean technology. It is straightforward to show that 2 > 0 i "d
2 < ("s + "r).The
adoption of clean technology reduces  and , providing welfare benets. However, it also reduces
, decreasing welfare. Firm prots and consumer surplus are unaected by the adoption of clean
technology at "d
2; technology 1 and 2 total unit costs are identical, resulting in identical quantities.
The left term of o is total domestic production at the point of oshoring and the right term is
the unit welfare benet/cost of oshoring, where i and i are the production cost and emissions
intensity of the technology that the domestic rm used in the regulated region.7 Oshoring increases
 and decreases , both reducing welfare, and it decreases , increasing welfare. As a consequence,
oshoring can only provide a welfare benet without a border adjustment if "r "s.
Analysis of the regulator's optimal emissions price is facilitated by focusing on the social cost of
emissions and the conditions that determine whether welfare increases or decreases in each interval.
Proposition 8. Assume "enter < 0 < "d
2 < "o. The set of possible welfare-maximizing emissions
prices can be characterized based on the social cost of emissions:
a) If "s >"s;1 and "s >"s;2, then " 2f0;"d
2;"og:
b) If "s 2("s;2;"s;1), then " 2f"d
2;"og:
c) If "s <"s;1 and "s <"s;2, then " ="o:
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Figure 6 Figures 6a-6c correspond to Proposition 8a-8c. The magnitude of the social cost of emissions, "s,
relative to the thresholds "s;1 and "s;2 determines whether welfare increases or decreases over each
interval. The disjoint changes in social welfare, 2 and o, at the points of technology adoption and
oshoring, respectively, contribute in determining possible welfare-maximizing emissions prices.
7 2 and o are characterized here for the case in which foreign rms compete in the market. The characterization for
the case in which foreign rms do not compete is identical after substituting total output under a domestic oligopoly,
nd

A i+i"
b(nd+1)

, at emissions price "
d
2 and "o, respectively, for the total output terms (5) above.David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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The assumption "enter < 0 < "d
2 < "o establishes setting 1. In this setting, when domestic rms
produce in the regulated region, the magnitude of the social cost of emissions relative to the
thresholds "s;1 and "s;2 determines whether welfare increases or decreases when domestic rms use
technologies 1 and 2, respectively. Given that "s is greater than "s;1 and "s;2 in Proposition 8a,
social welfare decreases over both intervals. In this case, 2 and o can be positive or negative. If
either is suciently positive, the welfare-maximizing price would be "d
2 or "o, respectively, with 2
increasing in "s, "r, and 1 and o increasing in "r and 2. Similarly, focusing on Proposition 8b,
welfare increases over the interval "2[0;"d
2) and decreases over the interval "2["d
2;"o) as "s is less
than "s;1 and greater than "s;2. When "s;1 > "s;2 and "s > "s;2 (as is the case in Proposition 8b),
then 2 > 0, which eliminates zero as a possible welfare-maximizing emissions price. Related to
Proposition 8c, when "s is suciently small that welfare increases over "2["d
2;"o), then "r must be
suciently great that "s <"s;1 and o >0, making " ="o the only feasible solution.
Setting 2. In setting 2, over the interval " 2 [0;"enter], domestic rms compete without foreign
entry, with welfare concave in emissions price as previously noted. It facilitates analysis here and in
Section 5.2 to introduce notation related to potential optima. Dene Em
k;l("s) as the emissions price
that solves the rst order conditions for the interval within which domestic rms operate technology
k from location l while competing against foreign rms that operate technology m 2 f1;2g. The
superscript is dropped for intervals in which foreign rms do not compete. Therefore, over the
interval "2[0;"enter] in setting 2, E1;d("s) solves the FOC, with
E1;d("s)=
("s +"r)(nd +1)
nd
 
A 1
nd1
:
If E1;d("s) 2 [0;"enter], then it is the local optimum. Further, as in Setting 1, welfare increases if
"s <"s;1 over the entry interval in which domestic rms produce in the regulated region.
Proposition 9. Assume 0 < "enter < "o < "d
2. The set of possible welfare-maximizing emissions
prices can be characterized as follows:
a) If E1;d("s)<0, then " 2f0;"og.
b) If E1;d("s)2[0;"enter], then " 2fE1;d("s);"og.
c) If E1;d("s)>"enter and "s >"s;1, then " 2f"enter;"og.
d) If "s <"s;1, then E1;d("s)>"enter and " ="o.
The assumption 0 < "enter < "o < "d
2 establishes setting 2. Focusing on Proposition 9a (and the
corresponding Figure 7a), due to the concavity of welfare when domestic rms operate in the
regulated region without foreign entry, if E1;d("s)<0, welfare decreases over "2[0;"enter]. Possible
welfare-maximizing emissions prices are therefore restricted to 0 and "o. The latter is the optimal
emissions price if o is suciently great, with o increasing in "r and 1. For Proposition 9b, whenDavid Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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Figure 7 Figures 7a-7c correspond to Proposition 9a-9c. The relationship of ^ E1;d() to 0 and "enter determines
whether welfare increases, decreases or has an interior optimum over " 2 [0;"enter]. The direction of
change over the entry interval "2("enter;"o) and the disjoint changes in social welfare at o contribute
to determining possible welfare-maximizing emissions prices.
the local optimum E1;d("s) is interior to "2[0;"enter], the welfare-maximizing emissions price must
be either E1;d("s) or "o, depending on the magnitude and direction of o. When E1;d("s)>"enter,
as in Propositions 9c and 9d, welfare increases over "2[0;"enter]. In this case, welfare can increase
or decrease over the entry interval "e 2 ["enter;"o). However, welfare decreases over "e 2 ["enter;"o)
if "s >"s;1, as is the case in Proposition 9c. If "s <"s;1, then welfare increases in the entry interval.
This can only occur if the emissions cost that the regulator incurs is suciently great; i.e., "r >
p
Fb+1+ 1
1 . Such a condition implies that E1;d("s) > "enter and that o > 0. As a consequence,
"o is the only feasible solution in Proposition 9d.
5.2. Welfare-maximizing emissions price with border adjustment
As was the case without border adjustment, the emissions price thresholds driving technology
adoption, foreign entry (and exit), and oshoring lead to eight potential scenarios under a border
adjustment. These scenarios are all enumerated in Figure B.2 of Appendix B. However, two focal
settings develop general insights related to border adjustment eects.
)
Setting 2:
Type (d,f)
Location
1 , 11  , 2
Domestic
  
    
 
2 , 22  , ‐
     
 
Setting 1: 0   ̂ 
      
     ̂    
   ̂ 
     ̂    
  and
 ̂       ̂       
 
Type (d,f)
Location
1 , ‐ 1 , 2
Domestic
2 , 22  , ‐
 ̂    
   0   ̂         ̂     ̂    
 
Offshore
and  ̂      
 
Figure 8 Domestic (d) and foreign (f) technology type and domestic rm location in focal settings with border
adjustment. Black indicates foreign entry intervals and gray indicates intervals without entry.
As shown in Appendix T.1, welfare is concave over all intervals under border adjustment.David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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Setting 1. This setting arises when a border adjustment is implemented in setting 1 from Sec-
tion 5.1 if A is suciently great that foreign rms remain in the market over the interval "2[0; ^ "
f
2).
There are two points of disjoint welfare change: the benet/cost from domestic adoption of clean
technology, ^ d
2, and the benet/cost from foreign adoption of clean technology, ^ 
f
2. Similar to the
case without border adjustment, ^ d
2 is obtained by comparing welfare at the threshold ^ "d
2 with
domestic rms producing with technology 2 versus with domestic rms producing with technology
1. The welfare change for foreign rm clean technology adoption is obtained similarly, with
^ 
d
2 =nd
 p
Fb
b
+
2 +2"d
2 +  1  1"d
2
b
!
 
("s +"r)(1  2) 2 +1

and
^ 
f
2 =
0
@
A (nd +1)

2 +2^ "
f
2 + +
p
Fb

+nd
 
1 +1^ "
f
2

b
1
A 
(1  2)"s  (2  1)

:
The welfare drivers related to the domestic adoption of clean technology are identical to those
without border adjustment: A decrease in  and  improves welfare while a decrease in  decreases
welfare. Therefore, the marginal benet/cost of adoption (the right-hand term of ^ d
2) is identical
under both scenarios, with ^ d
2 >0 i "d
2 <("s+"r). However, the magnitude of technology adoption
welfare eects is strictly greater under a border adjustment, j^ d
2j > j2j, because total domestic
production (the right-hand term) is
2"d
2+(2 1)
b greater as a consequence of border adjustment8.
Welfare drivers resulting from the adoption of clean technology by foreign rms are similar, except
that such adoption does not reduce . Therefore, ^ 
f
2 >0 i ^ "
f
2 <"s.
Since welfare is concave over all intervals in the setting, analysis of ^ " resembles that for the
domestic oligopoly interval in setting 2 of Section 5.1, requiring the characterization of ^ Em
k;l("s)
for each interval. With the intuition developed in Section 5.1, the relevant insights under a border
adjustment can most economically be given directly from the FOC solutions.
Interval FOC Solutions
"2[0; ^ "
f
2) ^ E1
1;d("s)=
(1+)"s
1
"2[^ "
f
2;"d
2) ^ E2
1;d("s)=
(2+)2"s nd(1 2)
p
Fb
22  
nd(1 2)((2+ 1)"s+2+ 1 1"r)
22
"2["d
2; ^ "2
exit) ^ E2
2;d("s)=
(2+)"s
2
" ^ "2
exit ^ E2;d("s)=
("s+"r)(nd+1)2+2 A
2nd
Table 2 Setting 1 emissions price intervals and their FOC solutions, ^ E
m
k;d()
Table 2 provides each emissions price interval in setting 1 and their respective FOC solutions. In
the rst interval, " 2 [0; ^ "
f
2), domestic and foreign rms compete while producing with technology
8 ^ 
d
2 is characterized for the case where foreign rms compete in the market. The characterization for the case where
foreign rms do not compete is identical after substituting total output under a domestic oligopoly, nd

A 1+1"d
2
b(nd+1)

.David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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1, with the domestic rm operating in the regulated region. The FOC solution in this setting is
^ E1
1;d("s), which is the local optimum if it falls within the bounds 0 and ^ "enter. In the case of the
last interval, if ^ E1
2;d is greater than ^ "2
exit, then it is a local optimum.
It is clear from Table 2 that when foreign rms compete in the market, ^ " > 0 if "s > 0. At any
nonzero social cost of carbon, the FOC solution to the rst interval in the setting, ^ E1
1;d, is positive.
As a consequence, ^ " = 0 cannot solve the regulator's welfare maximization. This diers from the
emissions regulation setting with foreign entry but without a border adjustment, which is evident
in Figure 6a, where "s =30 and " =0.
It is also evident from Table 2 that ^ Em
k;l() is independent of "r when foreign and domestic rms
compete with like technologies (the rst and third intervals in the table). This results from domestic
rms' optimal quantity being independent of "r over these intervals per Proposition 3c.
Setting 2. This setting arises when a border adjustment is implemented in setting 1 from Sec-
tion 5.1 if thresholds ^ "enter and ^ "o are less than "d
2. There is a single disjoint welfare change in this
setting: the benet/cost resulting from oshoring, ^ o, with
^ o = nd
 p
Fb
b
!
 
(2 +  1)"s  1  1"r +2 +

: (6)
The welfare eect increases due to a decrease in , decreases due to a reduction in , and can
increase or decrease due to a change in . The latter can increase or decrease because global
emissions decrease as a consequence of oshoring under a border adjustment if 1 > 2 +, but
increase otherwise, per Proposition 7c. As before, the right term is the marginal benet/cost of
oshoring while the left is total domestic production in the setting.9
Analysis of ^ " follows from characterizing ^ Em
k;l("s) for each interval. Given the similarity to the
preceding discussion, a detailed analysis here would be redundant, so the solutions to the FOCs
are presented in Table C.1 within Appendix C.10
5.3. Welfare comparison with entry at "=0
Determining the value of a border adjustment policy requires a comparison of welfare eects with
and without such a mechanism. Given the uncertainty around the social cost of carbon, under-
standing the sensitivity of " and welfare dierences to such costs is also important.11
9 The characterization of ^ o for settings in which foreign rms do not compete in the market is identical to (6) after
substituting total output under a domestic oligopoly, nd

A 1+1^ "o
b(nd+1)

, for total domestic output under foreign entry.
10 It is worth noting, in the absence of foreign entry, ^ E1;d() with a border adjustment is identical to E1;d() without,
which is evident by comparing the rst interval in Table C.1 of Appendix C to E1;d() given in Section 5.1.
11 While Greenstone et al. (2011) provides a social cost of carbon point estimate of $21.40 per ton of CO2, they
provide a 95
th percentile estimate of $64.90 per ton of CO2.David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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Welfare Effect of Border Adjustment
(a) "
 =0 without border adjustment
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Welfare Effect of Border Adjustment
(b) "
 = "
d
2 without border adjustment
Figure 9 Figures 9a and 9b illustrate the dierence in welfare eects, and the sensitivity of these eects and
the welfare-maximizing emissions price to "s, with and without border adjustment. In Figure 9a, there
is an interval where ^ "
 results in foreign rms adopting clean technology while domestic rms do not.
In Figure 9b, there is an interval where ^ "
 results in foreign rms exiting the domestic market.
The examples above illustrate the dierence in welfare eects with and without a border adjust-
ment policy, and the sensitivity of these eects to the social cost of carbon. Focusing on Figure 9a,
" =0 and ^ " varies over "s. In the rst interval, where ^ " = ^ E1
1;d, domestic and foreign rms both
use technology 1. Given that ^ E1
1;d increases in "s and both sets of rms operate technology 1, foreign
quantities under border adjustment decrease in "s (Proposition 6b) and domestic quantities are
xed in "s (Proposition 6c). This decrease in total output results in a decrease in consumer surplus,
 , over the interval. In terms of total welfare, this decrease is oset by an increase in emissions
revenues, , and by a decrease in the total social cost of carbon, , with the latter dominated by
consumer surplus eects due to the low social cost of carbon within the interval. Over the next
two intervals, ^ " is equal to the threshold at which foreign rms adopt type 2 technology (the
third interval), or just less where I = ^ "
f
2  , with >0 arbitrarily small. The latter is the optimal
emissions price in the interval in which ^ "
f
2 >"s. Over such an interval, 
f
2 <0 (as described above),
so the adoption of clean technology by foreign rms would have a negative welfare eect. When
" = ^ "
f
2, the welfare-maximizing emissions price is such that foreign rms adopt clean technology
while domestic producers do not, which calls into question the fairness of a border adjustment
policy in such settings. In both of these intervals, ^ " is xed in "s, so quantities and emissions
levels remain constant. However,  increases over the interval, which follows from "s increasing
and a dierence in global emissions with and without border adjustment. Over the last interval in
Figure 9a, ^ " = E2
2;d("s), which increases in "s. Eects in this interval therefore parallel those in
the rst interval. However the contribution of the social cost of carbon to the dierence in total
welfare is far more pronounced given the greater values of "s.
In Figure 9b, domestic quantities and emissions are again constant at all values of "s, but in
this case " is the threshold of domestic clean technology adoption, "d
2. While ^ " is also "d
2 underDavid Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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border adjustment when "s is low. However, under border adjustment emissions price applies
to both domestic and foreign rm production. It follows that foreign entry is less under border
adjustment (Corollary 5), leading to greater domestic prot, lower consumer surplus, and fewer
global emissions. The latter becomes increasingly valuable from a welfare perspective as "s increases.
The second interval is similar to the last interval of the preceding example. Over the last interval,
^ " = ^ "2
exit; the emissions price at which foreign rms exit the domestic market. Therefore, Figure 9b
illustrates a setting under which a border adjustment could be viewed as anticompetitive. Foreign
entry that existed in the domestic market when "=0 is driven from the market.
5.4. Welfare comparison without entry at "=0
The examples above provide welfare comparisons with foreign entry when " = 0. The following
example illustrates a setting where a domestic oligopoly exists when emissions are unregulated.
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Welfare Effect of Border Adjustment
Figure 10 Unlike in Figures 9a and 9b, there is a domestic oligopoly when emissions emissions are unregulated
in this example. The domestic oligopoly persists at all levels of "s, but the regulator can incetivize
clean technology adoption with border adjustment and cannot without it.
As evident in Figure 10, in settings in which there is a domestic oligopoly without regulation
(when " = 0), there is no dierence in welfare with and without a border adjustment if "s is
suciently low. This follows from an identical welfare-maximizing emissions price with and without
a border adjustment and from border adjustment not impacting foreign rms (because there is
no entry). However, even without foreign entry, border adjustment provides a welfare advantage
if "s is suciently great. In this example, "o < "d
2 without a border adjustment, but ^ "o < "d
2 with
one; i.e., the regulator cannot incentivize clean technology adoption without a border adjustment
(Corollary 1), but can with one (Proposition 5a). Therefore, at the "s at which it is optimal under
a border adjustment to increase ^ " to "d
2 it is not optimal to do so without a border adjustment.
Over the interval in which " = E1;d and ^ " = "d
2, domestic rms use cleaner technology with
border adjustment than without it. This increases welfare due to a reduction in , while welfareDavid Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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decreases due to lower ,   (both due to reduced quantities), and  (due to the lower emissions
intensity of technology 2). This nets an overall welfare gain as "s increases. The welfare-maximizing
emissions price with a border adjustment, "d
2, is xed in "s, while E1;d increases in ", narrowing the
quantity dierence. Over the nal interval, the welfare-maximizing emission price without border
adjustment becomes "enter. Increasing emissions price further without a border adjustment would
result in foreign entry, which would lead to greater global emissions (Propositions 3d).
In this example, border adjustment enables the regulator to set an emissions price that results
in clean technology adoption by domestic rms, which results in lower global emissions. As "s
increases, the value attributed to this dierence increases as well, which increases the welfare advan-
tage of border adjustment. This example is pertinent to the cement sector in Europe which histor-
ically has operated as a domestic oligopoly, and for which "d
2 >"o; the estimated adoption thresh-
old of carbon capture and storage technology, the industry's most promising emissions-mitigating
technology-in-development, exceeds the estimated emissions cost of oshoring (European Cement
Research Academy 2009, Boston Consulting Group 2008).
In each of the cases illustrated here and in Section 5.3, welfare under border adjustment is no
less than welfare without a border adjustment, and the benet that border adjustment provides
increases in "s. In general, a border adjustment provides a greater advantage at a greater per-ton
social cost of carbon. A border adjustment provides a welfare advantage in these settings due
to cleaner foreign production when entry occurs, as seen over intervals in Figure 9a; due to the
preservation of domestic rm prots, as seen in Figure 9b; and due to the ability to induce clean
technology adoption among domestic rms in settings in which it is not possible to do so without a
border adjustment, as seen in Figure 10.12 However, these examples also highlight concerns related
to the fairness and potential anticompetitive nature of border adjustments. The welfare-maximizing
emissions price under a border adjustment can result in clean technology adoption by foreign rms
but not by domestic rms, as seen in Figure 9a, or result in driving foreign competitors from
the domestic market, as seen in Figure 9b. Sectors in which these latter issues are likely to arise
could be selectively avoided if border adjustments were applied to specic industries, as debated
in Europe, rather than applied as a blanket policy to all emissions-regulated sectors as proposed
in the Waxman-Markey Bill (U.S. Congress, House 2009).
The risk of \reciprocal" taris. In addition to the welfare drivers included in (4), the domes-
tic regulator must consider the risk of \reciprocal" taris that developing economic powers have
threatened (e.g., Rappeport 2009, April 21; Kanter 2009, December 17). These \reciprocal" taris
would almost certainly target sectors other than those covered by the border adjustment. The
12 While not shown here, it is also straightforward to illustrate an example where a border adjustment provides a
welfare advantage due to cleaner oshoring.David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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European Commission, for example, has debated border adjustment in the steel and cement sectors,
but Europe is not an exporter of these goods to developing economies. Therefore, a \reciprocal"
tari would have to target arbitrary other sectors. Estimating the potential sectors selected and
the magnitude of such a tari is beyond the scope of this paper, but the domestic regulator would
need to mitigate this threat (or weigh its potential fallout against the welfare advantages derived
from a border adjustment) in order to fully assess the value of such a policy. A natural rst step
in mitigating the threat would be to target border adjustment only to sectors where foreign entry
that existed prior to the implementation of emissions regulation would not be diminished.
6. Implications and Conclusions
Without a border adjustment, the domestic regulator's ability to induce clean technology adoption
is limited by the emissions price at which domestic production would move oshore (Corollary 1), a
threshold that can occur at emissions prices suciently low to be of practical concern (Boston Con-
sulting Group 2008). On the other hand, when a border adjustment is implemented, the domestic
regulator is limited in its ability to decrease emissions in the region (Proposition 6c), which carries
nancial implications if the regulator faces emissions costs of their own. Further, foreign entry is
shown to decrease in emissions price over intervals in which domestic production is inelastic in
emissions price (Propositions 6b and 6c), suggesting that the debate related to whether border
adjustments are potentially anticompetitive is likely to continue.
The popular belief is that a border adjustment eliminates the threat of carbon leakage. However,
this is not always the case when rms choose production technologies and oshore producers hold a
comparative cost advantage. In such a setting, foreign rms adopt clean technology at a lower emis-
sions price than domestic rms (Proposition 5b), with entry conditionally increasing in emissions
price over intervals in which foreign rms hold this advantage (Proposition 6b). Further, domestic
rms conditionally move oshore despite a border adjustment, adopting cleaner technology when
doing so (Proposition 5c). As a result, carbon leakage can occur under a border adjustment. When
it does occur, global emissions conditionally decrease (Propositions 6e and 7c), which contrasts the
increase that results in the absence of a border adjustment (Propositions 3d and 4c).
A border adjustment is shown to provide four conditional sources of welfare advantage: 1) the
preservation of domestic rm prots by reducing or limiting foreign entry; 2) cleaner entry due
to the adoption of lower-emissions technology by foreign rms; 3) cleaner domestic production in
settings in which incentivizing the adoption of clean technology through emissions regulation is not
possible without a border adjustment; and 4) cleaner oshoring by domestic rms. The latter two
sources of advantage are mutually exclusive. In order to be accounted for in welfare analysis, all but
the rst of these potential sources of advantage require endogenous technology choice, highlighting
the importance of incorporating this decision in assessments of border adjustment policy.David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
29
While a border adjustment provides clear advantages, it also raises issues related to its potential
to prove anticompetitive. In some settings, the welfare-maximizing emissions price under border
adjustment results in the adoption of clean technology by foreign rms but not by domestic rms.
In other settings, it results in displacing foreign competition that would exist in the market without
emissions regulation. A sector-specic border adjustment, as debated in Europe, could be targeted
to avoid these issues and may therefore improve the likelihood of WTO approval.
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Appendices
A. Parameters for Numerical Illustrations
Figure(s) A b F nd 1 1 2 2    "s "r
Figures 1a and 2a 120 .01 1000 4 70 .70 85 .20 .85 30 .15 - -
Figures 1b and 2b 120 .01 1000 4 75 .70 85 .20 .85 30 .15 - -
Figure 3a - - - - 50 1.0 70 .20 .75 20 - - -
Figure 3b - - - - 50 1.0 70 .20 .75 15 - - -
Figures 4a and 4b 120 .01 1000 4 50 .70 65 .20 .85 15 .10 - -
Figure 6a 150 .05 1500 3 50 .75 60 .15 .80 25 .10 30 10
Figure 6b 150 .05 1500 3 50 .75 60 .15 .80 25 .10 30 40
Figure 6c 150 .05 1500 3 50 .75 58 .25 .80 25 .10 0 85
Figure 7a 120 .01 2000 4 50 .60 65 .20 .95 25 .05 20 0
Figure 7b 120 .01 2000 4 50 .60 65 .20 .95 25 .05 20 15
Figure 7c 120 .01 2000 4 50 .60 65 .20 .95 25 .05 20 30
Figure 9a 125 .01 1000 4 50 .75 60 .1 .75 25 .1 varies 0
Figure 9b 120 .01 1500 4 50 .80 60 .1 .75 25 .1 varies 20
Figure 10 120 .01 1500 4 50 .75 65 .15 .85 25 .1 varies 0
Table A.1 Market, cost and emissions parameters used in numerical illustrations.David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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B. Settings without and with Border Adjustment
Settings without border adjustment
Type (d,f)
Location
1 , 1
Domestic
1 , 1
a)         0         
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c)
Type (d,f)
Location
           
Domestic Offshore
1 , ‐ 1 , ‐
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Location
1 , 12  , 1
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1 , 1
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d)
        0    
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Domestic Offshore
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ߝ௘௡௧௘௥ ߝ௢ ߝଶ
ௗ
2 , 1
Intervals without foreign entry
Intervals with foreign entry
Figure B.1 Possible technology adoption, location, and foreign entry settings without border adjustment: b)
corresponds to setting 1 in Section 5.1, and e) corresponds to setting 2 in Section 5.1.
Settings with border adjustment
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Figure B.2 Possible technology adoption, location and foreign entry settings without border adjustment: b)
corresponds to Setting 1 within Section 5.2, and e) corresponds to setting 2 within Section 5.2.David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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C. FOC Solutions in Setting 2 with Border Adjustment
Interval FOC Solutions
"2[0; ^ "enter) ^ E1;d("s)=
("s+"r)(nd+1)
nd  
A 1
nd1
"2[^ "enter; ^ "o) ^ E2
1;d("s)=
(2+)2"s nd(1 2)
p
Fb
22  
nd(1 2)((2+ 1)"s+2+ 1 1"r)
22
"2[^ "o; ^ "2
exit) ^ E2
2;o("s)=
(2+)"s
2
" ^ "2
exit ^ E2;o("s)=
(nd+1)(2+)"s+(2+ A)nd
nd
22
Table C.1 Setting 2 emissions price intervals and their FOC solutions, ^ E
m
k;d()David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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Technical Appendix
T.1 Proofs
Proof of joint concavity of rm objectives. First order conditions for rm i 2 Nd and
rm j 2Nf are
@i(Xd;Xo;Y )
@xi;l
=A b(Xo +Xd +Y ) bxi;l  ci(")=0; 8i2Nd; (T.1)
and
@j (Xd;Xo;Y )
@yj
=A b(Xo +Xd +Y ) byj  j   =0; 8j 2Nf: (T.2)
The joint concavity of rm objectives can be proven directly through the Hessian H(), where
H()=
2
6
6 6 6
6 6
6 6 6
6 6
6 6
4
@21()
@x2
1;l

@21()
@x1;l@xnd;l
@21()
@x1;l@y1 
@21()
@x1;l@ynf
. . .
...
@2nd()
@xnd;l@x1;l
@2nd()
@x2
nd;l
@21()
@y1@x1;l
@21()
@y2
1()
. . .
...
@2nf ()
@ynf @x1;l
@2nf ()
@y2
nf
3
7
7 7 7
7 7
7 7 7
7 7
7 7
5
;
Based on the FOCs given by Equations (T.1) and (T.2), it is clear that the second derivative of
domestic and oshore objectives are
@2i()
@x2
i;l
= 2b; 8i2Nd; and
@2j()
@y2
j
= 2b; 8i2Nd; 8j 2Nf;
while the cross-partials are
@2i()
@xi;l@yj
= b; and
@2j()
@yj@xi;l
= b; 8i2Nd; 8j 2Nf:
Elements composing the main diagonal of the Hessian are equal to  2b while all other elements
are equal to  b. As a consequence, all odd-ordered leading principle minors are strictly negative
and all even-ordered leading principle minors are positive, thereby implying strict concavity. 
Proof of Corollary 1 Given that 2 > 1 under Assumption 2, 1 + < 2 + 8". There-
fore, foreign rms do not adopt clean technology as a consequence of emissions regulation. Domestic
rms, if producing within the regulated region, would adopt clean technology at a minimum " such
that 1 +1"=2 +2", i.e., at the threshold "d
2 =
2 1
1 2. Therefore, if 1 + <2 +2

2 1
1 2

,
then domestic rms would oshore rather than adopt type 2, and type 2 would not be adopted at
any ". 
Proof of Proposition 1. Equilibrium quantities under free entry are required to prove Propo-
sition 1, and are dened by the following Lemma:David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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Lemma 1. With the number of domestic and foreign competitors xed at nd and nf, respectively,
domestic rms produce at equilibrium quantities
x

i;l =
A ci(")
b(nd +nf +1)
+
nf

cj  ci(")

b(nd +nf +1)
;
and foreign rms will compete in the domestic market with equilibrium quantities of,
y

j =
A cj
b(nd +nf +1)
 
nd

cj  ci(")

b(nd +nf +1)
:
Proof of Lemma 1. Since the problem is symmetric for all domestic rms and is likewise
symmetric for all foreign rms, solving Equation (T.2) for y
j yields
y

j =
A cj  bndxi;l
b(nf +1)
; 8j 2Nf: (T.3)
Substituting (T.3) into Y =nfyj within Equation (T.1) and then solving for xi;l yields
x

i;l =
A ci(")
b(nd +nf +1)
+
nf

cj  ci(")

b(nd +nf +1)
; 8i2Nd; (T.4)
which, by substituting into Equation (T.3) yields
y

j =
A cj
b(nd +nf +1)
 
nd

cj  ci(")

b(nd +nf +1)
; 8j 2Nf: (T.5)

The number of oshore entrants follows directly from its denition,
max
yj
j (Xd;Xo;Y )=max
yj
h
P (Xd;Xo;Y )yj  cjyj
i
=F; 8j 2Nf:
)[A b(ndxi;l +nfyj)]yj  cjyj =F; 8j 2Nf:
The result then follows from the constraint that nf 0 and standard algebra.
n

f =max

0;
A cj  nd(cj  ci("))
p
Fb
 nd  1

:  (T.6)
Proof of Proposition 2 By the denition of ci("), when "<
1+ i
i domestic rms produce
within the regulated region. Therefore, under the conditions of Proposition 2, a domestic oligopoly
results with xi;d following from Equation (T.4) when n
f =0 and ci(")=i +i".

Proof of Proposition 3. By a direct comparison of domestic rm costs, the condition " <
1+ i
i implies that domestic rms produce within the domestic region rather than oshore.David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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Therefore, under the conditions of Proposition 3, ci(")=i +i". The result follows by substitut-
ing the right-hand argument of (T.6) into the exogenous entry solutions for xi;l and yj given by
Equations (T.4) and (T.5).
Foreign entry n
f, which is given by the right-hand argument of (T.6) when n
f >0 as in Propo-
sition 3, and total foreign rm production, Y =n
fyj both increase in ", with
dn
f
d"
=
ndi p
Fb
; and
dY
d"
=

ndi p
Fb
 p
Fb
b
!
=
ndi
b
: (T.7)
Total domestic production Xd+Xo =ndx
i;l also increase under the conditions of Proposition 3a,
with
dXd +Xo
d"
= 
ndi
b
: (T.8)
Proposition 3b follows directly from (T.7) and (T.8). Proposition 3c follows by noting that
total production increases in " by foreign rms in (T.7) exactly oset production total domestic
decreases in " given by (T.8). Proposition 3d, follows from Proposition 3b, with domestic emis-
sions ndx
i;di decreasing at rate
d ndx
i;di
d " = 
nd2
i
b . Global emissions, ndx
i;di +n
fy
j(j + with
d ndx
i;di+n
fy
j j
d " = 
nd2
i
b +
ndi
b (j +)
ndi
b , given that j i. 
Proof of Proposition 4. When ">"o =
1+ i
i , domestic rms oshore, which follows from
the denition of ci("). Under oshoring, there are two cases to consider with respect to Proposi-
tion 4a: when foreign rms compete in equilibrium { i.e., n
f >0 which occurs when ""o >"enter
{ and when they do not, i.e., n
f = 0 which occurs when "  "o and "o  "enter (following from the
denition of "enter and "o, and from Proposition 1). The proof in the case when foreign rms com-
pete is symmetric to the proof of Proposition 3a, while noting that domestic rms adopt foreign
rm economics under oshoring { i.e., ci(") = cj = 1 + . The result in the case of a domestic
oligopoly (i.e., "enter >"o, and therefore n
f =0) follows from (T.4) in the proof of Lemma 1 while
noting that n
f =0 and ci(")=1 + when ""o and "o "enter.
Proposition 4b follows from the equality of ci(") and cj under oshoring. Again, there are two
cases to consider: the case when foreign rms have entered (i.e., ""o >"enter), and the case when
there is a domestic oligopoly (i.e., ""o and "o "enter). From Proposition 1 and Proposition 4a,
""o >"enter implies
n

f =
A 1  
p
Fb
 nd  1>0 and x

i;l =y

j =
p
Fb
b
;
none of which depend on ". Therefore, foreign entry and domestic quantities are xed in ".
By Proposition 4a, quantities when ""o and "o "enter are
x

i;l =
A 1  
b(nd +1)
; and y

j =0;David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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which do not depend on ". Therefore Proposition 4b also holds when ""o and "o "enter.
Proposition 4c follows from a comparison of global emissions eg at the oshoring threshold
"o =
1+ i
i , ndx
i;l(1+) ndx
i;li ndx
i;l. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Proposition 5a follows from the denition of the total per unit cost
of domestic rms' preferred technology, ^ ci("). Under a border adjustment, domestic rms will adopt
clean technology at the minimum of "d
2 =
2 1
1 2 and ^ "o =
2+ 1
1 2 , which are both positive and
nite given that 2 >1 and 1 >2.
Proposition 5b follows from the oshore per unit production and capital cost advantage vis-a-vis
domestic production. Under a symmetric border adjustment, foreign rms prefer technology 2 to
technology 1 when 2 + 2" +   1 + 1" + . Therefore, the lowest emissions price at which
a foreign rm prefers technology 2 is ^ "
f
2 = 

2 1
1 2

. By a similar argument, the lowest price at
which a rm producing domestically prefers technology 2 to technology 1 is at "d
2 =
2 1
1 2.  2(0;1)
implies ^ "
f
2 <"d
2 at emissions prices such that domestic rms produce locally.
Three cases must be considered with respect to Proposition 5c: when domestic and foreign rms
produce with technology 1; when domestic and foreign rms both produce with technology 2; and
when domestic rms produce with technology 1 and foreign rms produce with technology 2.
Case 1: " < ^ "
f
2. Note that ^ ci(0) = 1 < 1 +  = ^ cj(0) by Assumption 3. As a consequence,
^ ci(")=1 +1"<1 +1"+ = ^ cj(0) 8"< ^ "
f
2. Therefore, domestic rms will not oshore at any
emissions price for which technology 1 is optimal for rms producing oshore.
Case 2: ""d
2. Assume 9"j2+2"<2+2"+. Under such an assumption, it is evident that
^ ci(") = 2 +2" < 2 +2"+ = ^ cj("); 8" > "d
2. Therefore, if there exists an emissions price for
which it is optimal for domestic rms to produce within the regulated region with technology 2,
then domestic rms will not oshore at any " greater than the domestic technology threshold, "d
2.
Case 3: " 2 [^ "
f
2;"d
2). Assume 1 >  +

2. Then the domestic technology threshold is greater than
the oshoring threshold ^ "o, "d
2 =
2 1
1 2 >
2+ 1
1 2 = ^ "o, which implies for an arbitrarily small 
^ ci(^ "o +)=minf1 +1(^ "o +); 2 +2(^ "o +)+g=2 +2(^ "o +)+:
Assume instead that domestic rms operate technology 2 oshore, i.e., ^ ci(") = ^ cj(") = 2 +
2(") + . Then, by case 2, "d
2 =
2 1
1 2 >
2+ 1
1 2 = ^ "o, which implies 1 >  +

2. It follows from
case 1, 2 and 3 that domestic rms will oshore i the optimal oshore technology is cleaner than
the optimal domestic technology, and 1 > +

2. 
Proof of Corollary 2 The proof is symmetric to that of Proposition 1, and follows directly
from Equation (T.6) while substituting ^ ci(") for ci(") and ^ cj(")=j +j"+ for cj. 
Proof of Corollary 3 By Proposition 5c and the denition of ^ ci("), when "<
2+ 1
1 2 domes-
tic rms produce locally. Therefore, under the conditions of Proposition 3, a domestic oligopoly
results with xi;d following from Equation (T.4) when ^ n
f =0 and ^ ci(")= ^ i + ^ i". David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
5
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof of Proposition 6a is symmetric to that of Proposition 3.
The result follows directly from ^ n
f > 0 (and therefore ^ n
f is dened by the right-hand argument
of Corollary 2), and by substituting ^ ci(") = ^ i + ^ i" for ci("), and ^ cj(") = ^ j + ^ j" +  for cj in
Equations (T.4) and (T.5).
There are two cases to consider with respect to Proposition 6b: the case when foreign rms
operate cleaner technology than domestic rms, and the case when domestic and foreign rms
operate the same technology.
CASE 1: " 2 [^ "
f
2;"d
2). Foreign technology is cleaner than domestic technology when " 2 [^ "
f
2;"d
2).
Further, by the conditions of Proposition 6;^ n
f > 0 and is dened by the right-hand argument of
Corollary 2. In this case,
d ^ n
f
d " =
 2+nd(1 2) p
Fb , which is non-negative when
1
2  1 +
1
nd, but is
strictly negative when
1
2 <1+
1
nd.
CASE 2: " = 2 [^ "
f
2;"d
2). Domestic and foreign rms operate the same technology when " = 2 [^ "
f
2;"d
2)
(type 1 if " < ^ "
f
2, and type 2 if " > "d
2). In such a case, ^ i = ^ j. It is clear from Corollary 2 (given
that ^ n
f >0) that
d ^ n
f
d " = 
^ j p
Fb <0.
With respect to Proposition 6c, there are again two cases to consider: the case when foreign
rms operate cleaner technology, and the case when domestic and foreign rms operate the same
technology.
CASE 1: " 2 [^ "
f
2;"d
2). Foreign rms operate technology 2 and domestic operate technology 1
when " 2 [^ "
f
2;"d
2). It is clear from Proposition 6a that total domestic production Xd +Xo = ndx
i;d
decreases in ", with
dndxi;d
d"
=nd

2  1
b

<0:
CASE 2: " = 2 [^ "
f
2;"d
2). Domestic and foreign rms operate the same technology when " = 2 [^ "
f
2;"d
2).
In such a case, ^ i = ^ j, and it is clear from Proposition 6a that
d ndxi;d
d " = 0 and total production
by domestic rms is therefore xed in emissions price.
For Proposition 6d, there are again two cases to consider: the case when foreign rms operate
cleaner technology than domestic rms, and the case when domestic and foreign rms operate the
same technology.
CASE 1: "2[^ "
f
2;"d
2). Given that ^ n
f, when foreign rms operate technology 2 and domestic rms
operate technology 1, it is evident from Corollary 2 and Proposition 6a that total production
Xd +Xo +Y =ndx
i;d + ^ n
fy
j decreases in ", with
dXo +Xd +Y
d"
=nd

2  1
b

+

 2 +nd(1  2)
p
Fb
 p
Fb
b
= 
k
b
<0:
CASE 2: " = 2[^ "
f
2;"d
2). When domestic and foreign rms operate the same technology and ^ n
f >0, it
is also clear from Corollary 2 and Proposition 6a that total production Xd+Xo+Y =ndx
i;d+^ n
fy
j
decreases in ", with
d Xo+Xd+Y
d " = 

k p
Fb
 p
Fb
b = 
k
b <0.David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
6
By Proposition 6b, foreign entry can only increase in " if " 2 [^ "
f
2;"2
k) and
k 1
k  1+
1
nd. Under
these conditions, and ^ n
f >0, oshore rms operate technology 2 and domestic rms operate tech-
nology 1. As a consequence, global emissions, eg, conditionally decreases in ", as
deg(Xd;Xo;Y )
d"
= nd(1  2)
2 +nd(1  2) 2(2 +)
is negative if  (1  2)<(1  2)
2+
2(2+)
nd , but is otherwise positive, proving Proposition 3e.

Proof of Proposition 7. With respect to Proposition 7a, two cases must be considered: when
domestic rms oshore and there is no foreign entry, i.e., ^ n
f =0; and when domestic rms oshore
and face competition from entrants, i.e., ^ n
f >0:
CASE 1: ^ n
f = 0: When " 
A 2  (nd+1)
p
Fb
2 , ^ n
f = 0 by Corollary 2. In such a case, domestic
quantities follow from Equation T.4 with ^ n
f =0 and substituting ^ ci(")=2 +2"+ for ci(").
CASE 2: ^ n
f >0. ">
A 2  (nd+1)
p
Fb
2 implies ^ n
f >0 by Corollary 2. Under this condition, x
i;o
and y
j are determined by Equations (T.4) and (T.5), respectively, while substituting the right-hand
argument of Corollary 2 for ^ n
f, and ^ ci(")= ^ cj(")=2 +2"+ for ci(") and cj.
Proposition 7b follows from 7a when ^ n
f =0, and from Proposition 7a and Corollary 2 when ^ n
f >
0. In the former case, clearly
d Xo+Xd+Y
d " = 
nd2
b(nd+1) <0. In the latter case,
d Xo+Xd+Y
d " = 
2
b <0.
Proposition 7c follows from a comparison of global emissions eg at the oshoring threshold
^ "o =
2+ 1
1 2 when technology 1 is utilized by domestic rms within the regulated region, and when
technology 2 is utilized oshore. It is straightforward to show that global emissions are strictly less
under oshoring if 1  2 > for the case when ^ n
f =0, and when ^ n
f >0.
Proposition 7d follows from the denition of global emissions, and the solutions provided for ^ n
f
in Corollary 2 and for x
i;o and y
j in Proposition 7a. When ^ n
f = 0,
d eg
d " =  
nd2(2+)
b(nd+1) , and when
^ n
f >0,
d eg
d " = 
2(2+)
b , which are both negative. 
Proof of welfare concavity without border adjustment. Table T.1 summarizes each ele-
ment of domestic welfare under each potential equilibrium market structure:
Domestic Oligopoly Domestic Prod. & Entry Oshore Prod. & Entry Oshore Oligopoly
 nd

i () nd

i () nd

i () nd

i ()
 
1
2b(ndx

i)
2 1
2b(ndx

i +n

fy

j)
2 1
2b(ndx

i +n

fy

j)
2 1
2b(ndx

i)
2
 ndx

ii" ndx

ii" - -
 ndx

ii"r ndx

ii"r - -
 ndx

ii"s
 
ndx

ii +n

fy

j(j +)

"s
 
ndx

i(i +)+n

fy

j(j +)

"s ndx

i(i +)"s
Table T.1 Welfare elements under the four possible equilibrium market structures without border adjustment.
With i given by (1), 
f by Proposition 1, and domestic and foreign quantities for each market
structure given by Propositions 2, 3a, and 4a, the welfare objective FOCs follow directly:David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
7
Domestic Oligopoly FOC and concavity:
"=
("r +"s)(nd +1)i  A+i
ind
(T.9)
@2W
@2"
= 
i
2nd
2
b(nd +1)
2 (T.10)
Domestic Production and Foreign Entry rst derivative and concavity:
@W
@"
= 
i
p
Fb+(1 +  i)"s +  i  i"r +1

nd
b
(T.11)
@2W
@2"
=0 (T.12)
Oshore Production and Foreign Entry FOC and concavity: It is clear from Proposition 1 and
Proposition 4a that, quantities and entry do not depend on ", when domestic rms operate oshore
and foreign rms compete in the market. Therefore
@W
@" =0.
Oshore Oligopoly FOC and concavity: As above, it is clear from Proposition 1 and Proposi-
tion 4a that, in the case of an oshore oligopoly, quantities and entry do not depend on ", and
therefore
@W
@" =0.
Based on (T.10), it is clear that welfare is concave in emissions price under a domestic oligopoly.
Based on (T.12) and the independence of rm decisions wrt to " when domestic rms operate
oshore, it is clear the welfare is linear in " under these market structures. 
Proof of Proposition 8. The properties dened in the following Lemma facilitate the proof.
Lemma 2. a) Welfare increases over the interval " 2 [0;"d
2) i "s < "s;1 =  
p
Fb+1 1"r+ 1
 ,
and over the interval "2["d
2;"o) i "s <"s;2 = 
p
Fb+1 2"r+ 2
1+ 2 .
b) The disjoint change in social welfare resulting from the adoption of clean technology at "d
2 is
2 =
 p
Fb
b
+
1 +  1  1"d
2
b
!
(("s +"r)(1  2) 2 +1)nd:
c) The disjoint change in social welfare resulting from domestic rms oshoring at "o is
o = 
p
Fb
b
nd((1 +  2)"s  2  2"r +1 +):
d) If "s <"s;2, then o >0.
Proof of Lemma 2. Lemma 2a follows directly from solving for the "s such that
@W
@"  0,
where
@W
@"
= 
p
Fb+(1 +  i)s  ir +  i +1

ndi
b
: (T.13)David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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Lemma 2b follows from a direct comparison welfare at " = "d
2. Dening W m
k;l(a) as welfare at
" = a when domestic rms operate technology k in region l while competing against foreign rms
operating technology m. The disjoint social welfare gain for clean technology adoption follows
directly; 2 =W 1
2;d("d
2) W 1
1;d("d
2).
Using the notation dened above, Lemma 2c follows directly from a comparison of welfare at
"o when domestic rms produce oshore versus when they produce domestically; o =W 1
1;o("o) 
W 1
2;d("o).
For Lemma 2d, rst note that o > 0 i "s <
2 1+r2 
1+ 2 , which follows directly from
Lemma 2c. It also follows directly that "s;2 <
2 1+r2 
1+ 2 . Therefore, if "s < "s;2, then "s must
also be less than
2 1+r2 
1+ 2 , and therefore o >0. 
With respect to Proposition 8, welfare is linear over all intervals given that, without border
adjustment,
@2W
@2" =0 for all market structures aside from a domestic oligopoly (which is not included
in Setting 1). Therefore, the welfare-maximizing emissions price must occur at a boundary, with
the set of options limited to 0, "d
2  , "d
2, "o  , and "o, where >0 and arbitrarily small.
Proposition 8a: By Lemma 2a, under the conditions of Proposition 8a, welfare decreases linearly
over the intervals " 2 [0;)"d
2) and " 2 ["d
2;"o). Therefore, "d
2    and "o    can be eliminated as
potential boundary solutions.
Proposition 8b: By Lemma 2a, under the conditions of Proposition 8b, welfare increases linearly
over the interval " 2 [0;)"d
2), and decreases linearly over the interval " 2 ["d
2;"o). Therefore, 0 and
"o   can be eliminated as potential boundary solutions.
Proposition 8c: By Lemma 2a, under the conditions of Proposition 8c, welfare increases linearly
over the intervals " 2 [0;)"d
2) and " 2 ["d
2;"o). Therefore, 0 and "d
2 can be eliminated as potential
boundary solutions. By Lemma 2d, o >0 and "o   can be eliminated as a potential solution.

Proof of Proposition 9. The properties dened in the following Lemma facilitate the proof.
Lemma 3. a) If it is interior, E1;d("s) is the local optima over the interval "2[0;"enter], where
E1;d("s)=
("s +"r)(nd +1)
nd
 
A 1
nd1
:
b) The disjoint change in social welfare resulting from domestic rms oshoring at "o is
o = nd

A 1 +1"
b(nd +1)

("s  2  1"r +1 +):
c) If "s <"s;1, then o >0.David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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Proof of Lemma 3. Lemma 3a, follows directly from the FOC under a domestic oligopoly in
settings without border adjustment, which is given by (T.9).
The proof of Lemma 3b is similar to that of Lemma 2b and 2c, and follows directly from
a comparison of welfare at "o when domestic rms produce oshore versus when they produce
domestically; o =W 1
1;o("o) W 1
1;d("o). The key dierence between this case and that in Lemma 2
is that, in setting 2, the oshoring comparison is relative to the domestic use of technology 1, rather
than technology 2.
The proof for Lemma 3c, follows from a direct comparison of the social cost of carbon threshold
for o >0, given above, to "s;1. The latter is
p
Fb
 less than the former. 
Welfare increases over the interval " 2 ("enter;"o) if "s < "s;1, per Lemma 2a. If welfare decrease
over the interval, then welfare is greater at " = "enter, than it is at any point in the interval. If
welfare increase over the interval, then o > 0 and welfare is greater at "o than it is as any point
in the interval, per Lemma 3d.
Proposition 9a: Under the conditions of Proposition 9a, welfare decreases over the interval " 2
[0;"enter] due to the concavity of welfare in ". Therefore, the only possible solutions are at the
boundaries 0 and "o, with the latter following from the argument above.
Proposition 9b: Under the conditions of Proposition 9b, E1;d("s) is internal to "2[0;"enter], and
therefore the local optimal. As a consequence, the welfare-maximizing emissions price must be
E1;d("s) or "o, with the latter following from the argument above.
Proposition 9c: Under the conditions of Proposition 9c, welfare increases over the interval " 2
[0;"enter] due to the concavity of welfare in ", and welfare decreases over the interval "2("enter;"o)
by Lemma 2a. Therefore, the only possible solutions are at the boundaries "enter and "o, with the
latter only if o is suciently great.
Proposition 9d: Under the conditions of Proposition 9d, welfare increases over the interval " 2
[0;"enter] due to the concavity of welfare in ", and welfare increases over the interval "2("enter;"o)
by Lemma 2a. Given the latter, welfare is greater over the interval "2("enter;"o) than it is at any
point in the interval " 2 [0;"enter]. By Lemma 3d, o > 0 and welfare is greater at " = "o than at
any point in the interval "2("enter;"o). It follows that "o must be the welfare-maximizing solution.

Proof of concavity of regulator objective with border adjustment. Table T.2 summa-
rizes each element of domestic welfare under each potential equilibrium market structure:
With i given by (1), 
f by Proposition 1, and domestic and foreign quantities for each market
structure given by Propositions 2, 3a, and 4a, the welfare objective FOCs follow directly:David Drake: Carbon taris, technology choice, and comparative advantage
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Domestic Oligopoly Domestic Prod. & Entry Oshore Prod. & Entry Oshore Oligopoly
 nd^ 

i () nd^ 

i () nd^ 

i () nd^ 

i ()
 
1
2b(ndx

i)
2 1
2b(ndx

i + ^ n

fy

j)
2 1
2b(ndx

i + ^ n

fy

j)
2 1
2b(ndx

i)
2
 ndx

i ^ i" (ndx

i ^ i + ^ nfy

j ^ j)" (ndx

i ^ i + ^ n

fy

j ^ j)" ndx

i ^ i"
 ndx

i ^ i"r ndx

i ^ i"r - -
 ndx

i ^ i"s
 
ndx

i ^ i + ^ n

fy

j(^ j +)

"s
 
ndx

i(^ i +)+ ^ n

fy

j(^ j +)

"s ndx

i(^ i +)"s
Table T.2 Welfare elements under the four possible equilibrium market structures with border adjustment.
Domestic Oligopoly FOC and concavity:
"=
("r +"s)(nd +1)i +i  A
ind
(T.14)
@2W
@2"
= 
i
2nd
2
b(nd +1)
2 (T.15)
Domestic Production and Foreign Entry FOC and concavity:
"=
 ( j +i)

"sj +( "s  "r)i +j +"s +  i +
p
Fb

nd +(j +)j"s
j
2 (T.16)
@2W
@2"
= 
j
2
b
(T.17)
Oshore Production and Foreign Entry FOC and concavity:
"=
(2 +)"s
2
(T.18)
@2W
@2"
= 
2
2
b
(T.19)
Oshore Oligopoly FOC and concavity:
"=
((2 +)"s  A+2 +)nd +(2 +)"s
nd
22
(T.20)
@2W
@2"
= 
nd
22
2
b(nd +1)
2 (T.21)
It is clear from Equations (T.15), (T.17), (T.19), and (T.21) that welfare is concave in " under
each possible market structure. 